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Abstract: The Centre for Social Ontology working group project has been 
exploring the concept of a Morphogenic Society since 2013 (see Morgan, 2016b). 
The project is now drawing to a close. One of the arising issues from the project 
has been whether such a society can be and is liable to be one of human 
flourishing. In this short paper I explore one possible aspect of the concept of a 
Morphogenic Society.1 A Morphogenic Society may involve issues of “contingent 
necessity”. Contingent necessity may provide one way to think about human 
flourishing, and this in turn may highlight the potential significance of the 
concept of a Morphogenic Society as a resource in positional argument for 
human flourishing.  
 
The significance of the necessity that ‘need not be’ 
 
I’m going to start with what may appear initially to be pointless ruminative word 
play. There is an underlying purpose, so bear with me.  
Contingent necessity or the idea of a necessity that ‘need not be’ seems 
formally nonsensical. However, within human systems the formally nonsensical 
need not be nonsense, because context can provide a semantic spur in the form 
of an imperative. One can work to realise a potential, where context, sufficiently 
understood and explicated, creates the grounds for an imperative: ‘we can’ 
becomes ‘we should’ becomes ‘we must’. This by no means implies simple 
reduction to a There is No Alternative (TINA) position, since TINA is a rhetorical 
move to prevent understanding and close down reasoned argument. Contingent 
necessity refers to ways to explore arguments.2 TINA is ideological positioning, 
and is purposively restrictive, as exclusionary, in a pre-emptive way. Contingent 
necessity is intended to be posed differently to this.  
A necessity that ‘need not be’ seems silly in the abstract, but it is a 
possibility precisely because of the characteristics of social reality. Humans are 
reflexive persons with agency. They are able to construct the social world, 
subject to material and cumulative structural and cultural conditions. 
Construction is also contestation. Often, to realise a potential we first realise that 
the potential needs to be realised. Realisation (to bring into being) may not be 
inexorable or ineluctable, yet it can be powerfully preferable and perhaps, in 
some circumstances, required for the most basic of purposes, including in some 
circumstances survival. Something can be ‘necessary’ ‘because of’ and ‘based on’. 
So, I am not referring here to the standard critical realist conceptualisation of 
                                                        
1 To emphasise: the following is not intended to be fully representative of all possible 
interpretations, aspects and arguments regarding a Morphogenic Society. For that one should 
refer to the published volumes. 
2 The grounds to construct the exclusion are also philosophically explicable as a Tina 
compromise, see Bhaskar, 1993, 116-119   
internal necessary relations (student-teacher), nor to J. L. Mackie’s INUS causal 
complex, but rather issues of futures (though these may then have internal 
necessary relations and INUS conditionality).3 In terms of futures, contingent 
necessity arises because of the characteristics of the human - we are deliberative 
creatures. Characteristics involve needs and capabilities and these are profound 
issues in terms of human flourishing, since what it is to flourish flows from what 
kind of being has the potential to flourish (see Assiter and Noonan, 2007; 
Martins, 2007). However, it is with the role of deliberation or reflexivity that I am 
principally concerned here, and as I will set out later, this too is constitutive of 
flourishing (and so a human capability and need). The social world is not just 
passively received. We do not simply recognize the various components of how 
we have lived, but rather deliberate about how we should live (based partly on 
responding to the consequences of how we have lived). This tempers 
temporality. Contingent necessity may flow from judgement. It applies to a 
position that is reasoned out as a response to the consequences of (whilst being 
made simultaneously possible by) an historical, in process, open social reality. 
Contingent necessity may seem initially odd, if not oxymoronic, but it is not 
thereby inconsistent as a statement in terms of the conditional aboutness of 
social reality.  
 Social reality can be referred to at various levels of generality. By 
common recognition many now live within Modernity (though clearly this is 
differentiated, disputed and involves also pre-modern practices in some places). 
Contemporary modernity is sometimes referred to as ‘Late’. The implication is 
that it is in its later stages and so in transition to something else. For some, it is 
already significantly different. Modernity is ‘liquid’ or other related terms, each 
intended to imply characteristics of flux, fluidity, non-fixivity, transcending of 
limits or constraint (for example, Bauman, 2000). For a realist, such language is 
problematic. It places an overwhelming emphasis on the absence of conditions. 
As such, it conflates two different things: first, the observation that the social 
world is variable and changing, and in some ways, under some descriptions, it 
may be more varied and changing more quickly; second, the inference that more 
variation and intensified change implies an absence of conditions and 
determinate (though not deterministic) processes: as though social reality, the 
social form, was no longer formed (and was instead defined as the social form 
that is implicitly formless - appearing in time rather than being produced 
through time).  
The Centre for Social Ontology working group, convened by Margaret 
Archer, has been exploring this conflation through a series of annual seminars, 
                                                        
3 For a clear statement of internal relations as necessary see Sayer, 1992, 89-92. Note Sayer also 
refers to contingency and necessity (neither of which implies regularity) in terms of an emergent 
form from the combination of two prior contingent relations (he is concerned here with ‘partial 
naturalism’ and notes ‘contingent necessity’ is a ‘confusing’ term) in Sayer 2000, 16-18. INUS 
refers to: an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but 
Sufficient. For example, a short circuit may be pivotal to an electrical house fire. See Mackie, 
1965. Mackie ties INUS to causation, and in this domain it invites criticisms because necessary 
conditions need not be causal in the active sense (though can be in the Aristotelian 4 causes 
typology). If I ask how was x murdered, and x was stabbed, then it is reasonable to state he was 
killed using a knife - but it would not be semantically appropriate to state the knife was the cause 
of his murder (rather than the means of his death). The condition is also conditional.     
reproduced in an five volume edited collection (again, see Morgan, 2016b).4 The 
intent has been to develop a more coherent realist approach to the potential for a 
new social form. The project takes seriously the observation of variation and 
change (without reducing the concepts of what is varied and what has changed 
to what is observed only). The potential social form is referred to as a 
Morphogenic Society. The choice of phrasing follows from the terminology of 
morphogenesis within Archer’s morphogenetic/static (M/M) approach to a 
social ontology of agents, structure and culture (see Archer, 1995). 
Morphogenesis refers to processes of elaboration, rather than stricter 
reproduction or morphostasis, of some distinguishable component of society: 
aspects of agency, structures and cultures. The concept of a Morphogenic Society 
follows tentatively from Archer’s prior work on reflexivity, which identified 
various forms of reflexivity increasingly operative in Modernity (see, Archer, 
2012). The point of departure for ontological speculation regarding the 
Morphogenic Society within the project is the issue of whether and in what sense 
reflexivity is rooted in an increasingly heterogeneous social reality. For example, 
whether agency is required to be more reflexive across a wider range of activity. 
If this is so, it may be indicative of incipient transformative effects on social 
reality, and hence the social form. A social form that is not simply disorder, that 
is, one that still makes sense in terms of explicable processes of determination, 
but which is more heterogeneous, may be one where morphogenesis comes to 
dominate (for conceptual clarification see, for example, Archer, 2013: pp. 12, 14 
and 18). Reflexivity is elaborative (though there is more to elaboration and its 
context than agency within M/M). If elaboration becomes increasingly significant 
then in a non-vicious circularity argument it may be indicative of a self-
reinforcing tendency: the social form becomes one where elaboration is 
increasingly called upon to manage the consequences of elaboration. As such, in 
so far as the social reality is ordered (which must be established rather than 
assumed) its forms of stabilization would be, by internal construction, non-
stationary.  
In the abstract this way of thinking about social reality can seem little 
different than approaches conceived in terms of metaphors of ‘liquid’ or flows 
and such. However, social reality, in its parts and wholes need not be considered 
as simply dissolving into formlessness. A reality of continually shifting difference 
and differentiation can still be recognizably relational and interactive. The idea 
of order as leading to meta-stability (a process that is identifiably reproducing) 
is not antithetical to a dominance of elaboration. The family, for example, in Late 
Modernity is increasingly differentiated, both in legal and normative ways (for 
issues see Archer, 2012 and Donati & Archer, 2015). Yet there is still law, norms 
and a concept of the family. There may be disintegrations, if one explores the 
nature of the social processes at work, but there are also recognizable pathways 
of mutually referenced change. If one expands this dynamic then the concept of a 
Morphogenic Society is not conceptually incoherent. Nor, given the many areas 
of modern life one could choose to focus on as locations where morphogenesis 
seems to be creating self-reinforcing tendencies, is the concept of a Morphogenic 
Society rendered empirically unlikely (in the sense that there is no observed 
                                                        
4 Note, there is also a series of reviews of the early volumes from the realist political economist 
Jonathan Joseph (2014; 2016). Amongst other things, Joseph highlights the need to identify a 
generative mechanism for a Morphogenic Society. 
morphogenesis that is cumulatively occurring in various ways - these in many 
respects are what theorists of Late Modernity (liquid etc) are seeking to grasp).  
However, a social order of stabilization without stasis where 
morphogenesis dominates still begs a variety of questions. A new social form is a 
transformation from a prior form. This creates issues regarding what constitutes 
sufficient difference to be a new social form. Since a Morphogenic Society is one 
dominated by morphogenesis then one can reasonably question what threshold 
of morphogenesis is required for social reality to be characterised as a 
Morphogenic Society. Widespread elaboration from elaboration is a matter ripe 
for dispute. One might contest the evidence based on use of evidence regarding 
framing issues: the construction of significant timeframes, geographical extent, 
whether a bounded whole involves elaborative elaboration -- calling forth more 
elaboration to deal with the consequence of what is elaborated -- and so forth. 
One might dispute the nature of change, and whether change is change to stay 
the same and more akin to morphostatic reproduction rather than 
transformation through elaboration.  
The scope for dispute, however, is not a weakness of the concept of a 
Morphogenic Society per se, it is a problem of the complexity of the world that 
we then seek to conceptualise and categorise, and it is a problem of identifying 
breaks and transformations (perhaps emergence, diachronically expressed) in 
what is otherwise a matter of historical processes that we are seeking to grasp 
from within. Dispute does not prevent subsequent agreement or recognition 
regarding transformations that have occurred or are occurring. It is worth 
bearing in mind that few social forms are heralded rather than retrospectively 
recognized - though some thinkers may be earlier articulators of the new than 
others (e.g. Smith or Marx on aspects of capitalism). Furthermore, the term 
morphogenesis is deliberately non-specific. It has meaning but is sufficiently 
flexible to apply to any number of constructs. In what sense a social form such as 
a Morphogenic Society is formed is, therefore, also disputable. It is here that I 
want to consider one aspect of the concept of a Morphogenic Society based on 
the idea of contingent necessity. 
 
The quality of a Morphogenic Society 
 
Morphogenesis in the abstract tells one little about the principles that drive, 
shape or motivate elaboration (what is ingrained in structures, culture, 
institutions etc). As such, it tells one little about how morphogenesis is situated 
either in particularities of some aspect of a social form or more broadly in terms 
of system-wide integrations. This is an additional issue, and in terms of the 
Morphogenic Society project has led to discussion regarding what qualities 
actually constitute a Morphognic Society over and above the dominance of 
morphogenesis.5 The nature of a Morphogenic Society is to some degree 
qualitatively open. That this can be so can be illustrated based on what is already 
around us, if one considers areas of morphogenesis.  
Financialisation has cumulatively resulted in powerful corporate actors 
(for example, Morgan 2009). Financialisation has resulted in transformed 
practices of finance, and also in increasing influence and reach of financialised 
                                                        
5 Notably in volume five, see Archer, 2017 
relations within other aspects of life, such as work, government, and the family. 
The consequences of this have in many ways required elaborative responses. For 
example, management of budgets within the family in Austerity Britain has 
become increasingly creative based on new constraints, and this feeds into forms 
of elaboration within and beyond the family. A 2013 UK Office of National 
Statistics report on social exclusion and poverty found that 36.6% of the 
population were unable to meet sudden unexpected expenses. As Rowntree and 
the Bank of England have also noted, large swathes of the UK population are 
trapped in debt vulnerability situations. They are experiencing changed 
circumstances to which they must respond creatively and yet without significant 
power to alter the circumstances they find themselves in. The context is 
elaborative in many ways, including the existence of more and different varieties 
of family. The underlying aspects of finance systems are shifting (legislative, 
practical etc). The interactions with households are also different than prior to 
the financial crisis, as is the context of employment. There are identifiable 
elements of morphogenesis occurring. However, if one considers the 
particularities of how elaborations are being shaped they do not involve 
profound transformations in the power and influence of some key corporate 
actors (for the limits of current reform of finance see Morgan and Sheehan, 
2015).  
If we generalise from this example, one can then make the point that 
situations that are more elaborative need not, simply by being elaborative, be 
positive for all or even the majority concerned. To be clear, no claim is made by 
Archer or others within the project that the concept of morphogenesis and that 
of the Morphogenic Society are intrinsically beneficial to given parties, quite the 
reverse. Morphogenesis as a concept is primarily descriptive-as-explanatory-
conducive of social activity and its consequences. It allows methodological 
insight into processes, subject to a social ontology. A Morphogenic Society is in 
the first instance one that follows from the balance of social activity so described. 
Thereafter, the qualities of such a society remain a matter of inquiry and dispute. 
In the spirit of critical inquiry participants in the project have consistently 
considered the various ways in which relations of Modernity may be extended 
(as elaborated), and whether particular qualities of what may be new may be 
detrimental to parties (see Archer, 2013, 2014). Participants are in general 
committed to generalised human flourishing, so a potentially oppressive kind of 
Morphogenic Society is clearly not one that participants want to argue for. But 
the point bears emphasising. A Morphogenic Society could be one that carries 
with it the oppressive and divisive qualities of the society from which the social 
form is a transition. A Morphogenic Society could be a transformation in some 
ways but not in others. Moreover, if one considers the consequences of the 
historical processes with which we are now living, this is not some minor 
concern or unlikely possibility. So, contingent necessity is an issue. 
Consider the current situation of climate change. Relatively few are aware 
that major state and international organizations, as well as corporations and 
high net worth individuals, are already planning securitised responses to climate 
change. To non-academics or those who do not read the Guardian or listen to 
Radio 4 or other country’s public access media, it can readily seem like a lunatic 
fringe claim. However, since the early 2000s, the CIA, the EU, and many others 
have commissioned reports on the possible security implications of climate 
change. Climate change is situated as a ‘threat multiplier’ (see Buxton and Hayes, 
2016). This is important because influential voices have begun to position 
responses based on worse case scenarios of more frequent erratic weather 
events, food and water resource conflicts, mass migration, and other issues. 
Some of this is scaremongering to create a climate of fear conducive to particular 
interests. However, it is not thereby irrelevant. The underlying logic is one where 
parties are not committing to preventing the causes (climate change), but 
positioning how to manage the consequences. So, climate change, rather than a 
problem to be solved based on social redesign to ensure the flourishing of all (a 
focus on universal genuine security of the person) becomes a matter of 
militarised security (for recent policy on climate change see Morgan 2016a; 
Spash, 2016). A logic of conflict, exclusions and oppressions is set in motion. If 
this seems cabalistic consider how democratic spaces are already beginning to 
be closed down. This was a process begun by the amorphous War on Terror. It 
has extended to the gradually erosion or withdrawal of rights through forms of 
legislation whose legitimacy is based on exceptional circumstances directed at 
exceptionalised persons, but which can actually be applied to almost anyone. The 
populations of the wealthy world are already cumulatively experiencing a 
discursive shift. Migration has already created a powerful sense of a divided 
world, austerity has already seen the imposition of finance-as-technical solutions 
to problems. One need only consider the problems of Greece, the rise of 
populism, Brexit and the election of Trump (see Sandbeck and Schneider, 2014; 
Bruff, 2014; Morgan, 2017; Fullbrook and Morgan 2017). It is not an unthinkable 
step from where we are now to acquiescence to increasingly authoritarian 
solutions and divisive approaches to the problems of the world. These may 
emerge to some degree from Taylor’s (1992) soft authoritarianism of democratic 
neglect, but also from the continued failure of democratic pushback and social 
movements (contingent though this is, see conclusion).6  
Clearly, a climate change affected future is one likely to call forth 
increasing need for elaborative responses. It may well, therefore, make more 
likely the possibility that the many kinds of morphogenesis one might observe in 
the social world become in turn a Morphogenic Society. However, the quality of 
that Morphogenic Society could readily be one that is dystopic rather than 
utopic. At the same time a Morphogenic Society, as various participants to the 
Centre for Social Ontology project have argued, need not be dystopic. If one 
considers morphogenesis in terms of possible associated characteristics then it 
has the potential to be conducive to human flourishing. Not only that, one can 
reasonably make the case that a survivable, meta-stable Morphogenic Society 
ought and perhaps must be one that pursues collective human flourishing. 
General human flourishing becomes a contingent necessity for and within a 
Morphogenic Society. The climate change example in particular can illustrate this 
point. In order to clearly establish what I mean by this I first set out some 
important aspects of the concept of eudemonia as human flourishing based on 
Aristotle’s work. There are, of course, many other sources one might use to 
consider human flourishing. 
 
Eudemonia and the Morphogenic Society 
                                                        
6 The point applies to many aspects of modern life, see Morgan, 2016c 
 
Eudemonia is typically translated as ‘human flourishing’. For Aristotle, such 
flourishing was the primary interest at which all other activity is directed. He 
was not concerned with outlining the specifics of a good society or with 
exploring or providing solutions to concrete moral dilemmas. For example, in 
situation x do y based on procedure z -- consequential, deontological etc. 
Aristotle’s specific concern was to consider the nature of virtue. That is, the 
various qualities attributed to emotion and action expressible in right conduct. 
Some of Aristotle’s concerns can seem anachronistic in terms of the context of 
qualities he discussed. For example, courage, honour, piety etc as these were 
meaningful to a Hellene of his time, though this does not mean they have no 
resonance today in different contexts. Moreover, some of his statements when 
taken in isolation can seem circular or vacuous. This is in so far as a great deal of 
the discussion of virtue takes it as given that, upon reflection, we know what is 
appropriate-as-virtuous conduct, and this is the same for others. So, an 
appropriate community is one that recognizes and practices goods. This can 
result in a reductive sense of: the good person is good, the good society is the good 
society. Concomitantly, Aristotle’s virtuous person can seem to be vulnerable to 
critique in two ways.  First, his concept fails to take due consideration of 
socialisation, and so is under-socialised as theory of the virtuous person whose 
concept and practice of virtue is affected by socialisation. There is a failure to 
recognize the harms done by the ‘virtuous’ in the name of virtue.7 Second, and by 
contrast, Aristotle’s virtuous person is ultimately conformist by reference group, 
and so detrimentally over-socialised in terms of actual practice and hence 
conduct qua virtue as ethics.8 Though there is some credence in the critiques 
they can also miss the point that Aristotle’s work is an expression of potential. A 
person is a work in progress, including through phronesis and Aristotle seems 
aware of the potential problems of his position.9 
 At the beginning of the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle explicitly 
recognizes that his focus can appear truistic and in a sense circular (Aristotle, 
1996, 12). As he also notes, the plausibility of any deliberation regarding virtue 
resides not only in a combination of the elaboration of the parts of the case 
made, but also in the actual practice of what is expressed in the general case. 
This cannot simply be proved or demonstrated in philosophy on the page. It can 
only be recognized through its realisation. So, any circularity along the lines of 
the good is good is non-vicious. Aristotle’s point of departure is that the human 
has needs and dispositions that can be expressed or repressed, and capacities or 
further potentials that can be identified, inscribed and cultivated. For Aristotle, 
the human is incomplete in relation to realisable goods. As such, Aristotle’s 
                                                        
7 Harms related to gender, race, slavery etc. ‘Be virtuous’ is an invocation to a quality of activity 
rather than to a given activity (the benevolent slave owner)   
8 For example, selective quotation can easily produce this impression: “the good man wishes for 
what is truly wished for… the good man judges everything correctly; what things truly are… what 
chiefly distinguishes the good man is that he sees the truth in each kind, being himself as it were, 
the standard and measure of the noble and pleasant.” Aristotle, 1996, 61. Blackledge & Knight eds 
(2008), includes essays that explore Aristotle via MacIntyre -- specifically the problem of 
developing a revolutionary or transformative core of ethics from Aristotle in the context of the 
determinations of capitalism.   
9 That is, ‘practical wisdom’ -- the cumulative experience accumulated through life on the basis of 
particularities. 
context for the development of argument is more suggestive of a commitment to 
or optimism in regard of the improvability of the human condition, rather than 
mere naivety in regard of the way that condition is conditioned. Aristotle’s virtue 
ethics are not antithetical to also considering the nature of given context, rules 
and such, in so far as these are relevant to given situations for reasoned practical 
engagement. So, virtue ethics need not be considered hermetically sealed from 
matters relevant to deontology and so forth. Moreover, cultivation is precisely a 
matter of willed or reflexive socialisation and this is necessarily relational since 
the reference group is a community capable of the same processes and activity.10 
In a modern context it can seem odd that Aristotle identifies reason(ing) as both 
a need and the highest good, rather than say care, community or active 
participation in the polis, but he does not neglect these.11 Rather they flow from 
or are situated to reason in Aristotle’s own work, but also in later developments 
from his work (see for example, Smith, 2015; Sayer, 2011). Moreover, though his 
doctrine of the mean, where conduct following reasoning on the nature of an 
issue rejects extremes, may be interpreted reductively as conformist, it might 
more appropriately be interpreted as centred rather than centrist. The point is to 
avoid extremes, in the sense of emotive qualities of reasoned conduct (acting in 
rage etc), rather than to a priori accept or reject principles of or substance of that 
conduct. One can still reject majority action or common contexts as incorrect, 
inappropriate, unjust etc through the reasoning process.  
In any case, Aristotle’s virtue ethics are directed at a recognized situation 
of social malleability, where the world is uncertain and where action is voluntary 
and involves choice.12 It is through deliberation and learning that virtue is 
cultivated and human flourishing or eudemonia realised. For the individual, this 
is a matter of a lifetime. For society, it is a never-ending process, since there is, 
though Aristotle does not spend any significant time oriented upon this, a formal 
contradiction or tension in eudemonia. Specifically, if the person is realised 
through reasoning and subsequent practices, and so is engaged in completion 
(she flourishes and hence can be referred to as operatively experiencing 
eudemonia) through reflexive activity, within and in regard of a community, then 
                                                        
10 Cultivation creates numerous theoretical and practical problems, since one cannot guarantee 
that socialisation and development are not pathological, and one must then address the problem 
of whether in actuality one is capable of recognizing the pathology. This, however, is a subset of 
the case regarding the possibility of judgemental rationality - usually pursued in terms of needs, 
dispositions, feelings etc - i.e. the claim that it is human characteristics, which make such 
cultivation possible. It is manifestly the case one can barbarise the human and create societies in 
which people do not flourish or in terms of which flourishing is in some sense harmed - but the 
very possibility of recognition creates the basis of the case that the alternatives are at least 
grounds that can be subject to judgement. Aristotle’s work is rooted in the claim that there is a 
duty to ‘prefer the truth’ (1996: 8); and based on the commitment to the possibility of truth, and 
in the context of ethics, that the truth of what is good is something that is translated into activity 
and then judged in terms of activity (for a real embodied human who is able to suffer and 
flourish).   
11 Aristotle’s work on ethics is developed in several essays collected in Volume 2 of Barnes’ 
edition of his complete works (1984), notably Nichomachean Ethics; Magna Moralia, Eudemian 
Ethics, On Virtues and Vices, and Politics. Aristotle is, of course, also well known for the claim that 
humans are political animals.    
12 Aristotle distinguishes between disposition and volition but the nuance of the argument is not 
significant here for the general point that there are dispositions and capacities that are realisable 
and that the context is ultimately uncertainty and choice, see 1996, Bk 3.  
that context and community must necessarily be perpetually incomplete for the 
individual to be able to engage in the activity which realises a key aspect of the 
self that is eudemonistic; hence a eudemonistic society must also be 
simultaneously non-complete as a eudemonistic society in order to be a 
eudemonistic society for the particular persons within, engaged, and 
constructing that society. This incompleteness must also extend to the person. 
Note, the contradiction or tension only arises if one insists on considering the 
problem as formal logic and treats terms as symbols rather than as conditional 
and shifting concepts with real referents.13 Much of the potential problem 
dissolves if one accepts that being is always becoming, that any particular state is 
also a process, and that eudemonia is practical, where one should not conflate 
the agreed constituents of the society over which deliberation continues to occur 
with the capacity to deliberate as a eudemonistic trait, which must continue to be 
enacted for the person to be flourishing.14 The apparent contradiction does not 
mean any society is as good (or bad) as any other, simply because we are always 
deliberating and seemingly need to do so. Rather the reverse is the case, it is a 
fully realised participatory (democratic) society that would seem to be central to 
eudemonia. This returns us briefly to a point signposted earlier. Deliberation, 
reflexivity, reason etc. are not just means to seek flourishing, they are 
constitutive aspects of flourishing. They are also powers or capacities of the 
human expressible as needs and capabilities, and so subsets of the general 
itemisation of needs and capabilities (though arguably they are subsets that 
exceed the set). One can find them in the work of Sen or Nussbaum. One can also 
align them as basic to Donati and Archer’s relational goods (2015, 199). That is, 
goods of ‘sociability’ that are continually achieved in a relation and that are not 
reducible to the instrumentality of the relation or goal. Such relation goals are 
typically community-rooted and pro-social.      
Moving on, though much of the potential problem of a contradiction 
dissolves when appropriately considered, the actual potential of eudemonia with 
reference to the Morphogenic Society does not. A Morphogenic Society is defined 
by its variegation and as a society of process and elaboration. It is one that 
concomitantly calls forth greater requirements for quotidian reflexivity merely 
to proceed. However, ‘calling forth’ does not guarantee that reflexivity has given 
qualities or actual consequences that are eudemonistic -- as, say, neoliberalism 
indicates. As such, there are phases to consider. Activity may be eudemonic-
conducive and, thereafter, a Morphogenic Society may be one that is eudemonic-
fit. For this to be so it must be reflexively constructed to be fit. There must be 
contestation of ways we should live. This raises issues that can be made sense of 
via contingent necessity. ‘We can’ becomes ‘we should’ becomes ‘we must’. This 
is an active process of reasoned conduct subject to some problem field and 
involving cultivation via virtue ethics that are themselves an aspect of 
flourishing.    
As regards the Morphogenic Society, for variation and heterogeneity to be 
other than disintegrating and destabilising, then, particular characteristics of a 
                                                        
13 Note: Aristotle is also widely recognized, along with Plato, as the source of the principles of 
logic that give rise to some of the problems here - including the excluded middle (see the 
Metaphysics, Bk iv in Barnes, 1984).  
14 All of which lead to dialectical theorisation of the grounds of being and freedom. See Bhaskar, 
1993 
social form would seem to be required based on the particular powers of the 
human: a society of variation and heterogeneity is potentially one of opportunity, 
greater choice, limited conformity to oppressive convention or simple 
reproduction of oppressive technocratic spheres; but this is only so in so far as 
stabilisation can occur without stasis. This seems to call forth qualitative aspects 
of the particular powers of the human. That is, reflexivity and reason rooted in a 
participatory medium i.e. precisely the grounds (if not the guarantee) of 
flourishing. When stated in the abstract and when the term eudemonia is used 
this can seem utopian wishful thinking at odds with the real world. But it is no 
more than the claim that the human condition is improvable, progress is 
possible, and for it to be so we are required to take responsibility for our actions 
individually and collectively. It starts with a step, it starts with a conversation, it 
starts with a policy or practice. There is nothing unrealistic or unrealisable about 
that.15    
The point I want to emphasise here is that the possibility of a eudemonic 
Morphogenic Society is dependent on practical forms of the characteristics 
which are themselves aspects of human flourishing - deliberative participation. 
In social theory one can place this point in a series of distinctions and inferences: 
  
1. Change and morphogenesis are not necessarily the same 
2. Morphogenesis is not necessarily eudemonic-conducive morphogenesis 
3. Morphogenesis can be eudemonic-conducive   
4. A Morphogenic society can be eudemonic-fit  
 
Here we return to the climate change issue by way of conclusion. 
 
Conclusion: human flourishing and contingent necessity 
 
In a prior section I noted that various tendencies in Late Modernity seemed to 
involve forms of elaboration that did not necessarily involve significant change 
                                                        
15 If an inter-human closed system could exist we would likely feel compelled to break it, which is 
a reasonable indication that such a system is impossible (or semantically incoherent as a 
statement for reference). No system is perfect not even a eudemonic system. Rather it seems in 
order to be eudemonic it would require to be imperfect (perfectly imperfect in order to be 
eudemonic, perhaps). Humans are problem solving, societies are open and so also throw up 
problems or opportunities to create problems (as challenges, new constructs etc). The real 
question is what kind for problems are desirable; problems, moreover, may simply be a different 
way of thinking about variety - problems are not necessarily problematic in the negative 
connotation of the term - but rather desirable, and even if adverse may still be something we long 
for - this is not irrational, or infantile or a sign we have not evolved as societies or a species. One 
should also note that there is a reciprocal relation between emotional well-being and practical 
outward oriented social existence. A society of individuals encouraged to increasingly focus in on 
themselves can create a distorted form of self-cultivation, which becomes about the 
superficialities of how one is projected to others; this in turn can result in perpetual anxiety since 
the grounds for self-concern can be continual self-criticism based on the failure to achieve an 
exteriorised ideal of the self. However, if one’s sense of self flows from an outward oriented 
project of what one does for others (rather than how one projects an acceptable perfected self) 
then the terms of emotional well-being are quite different and the implications for society are 
also fundamentally different.   
    
 
to power relations. I also noted that, developing from this, there was some 
possibility that responses to climate change might result in forms of oppressive 
elaboration and perhaps also a form of authoritarian Morphogenic Society. 
However, several further points can be made here by way of conclusion.  
An authoritarian form of Morphogenic Society is not inconceivable but it 
is also likely unsustainable. It seems to run counter to the capacities of the 
human (hence the surprising fragility of apparently powerful authoritarian 
regimes in history). Moreover, the underlying logic of planning for a divisive 
future is intrinsically built on limiting transformation in the underlying causes of 
climate change now. That is, the political economy built on carbons, consumption 
based growth models, and the spread of industrialisation through globalisation. 
Such an authoritarian Morphogenic Society would be one that reproduced and 
exacerbated the material-economic problems that called forth the authoritarian 
responses of that society. This can have a variety of consequences. First, the 
authoritarian response may fail precisely because it perpetuated underlying 
practices of a political economy. This occurs in many ways, including through the 
way knowledge is constructed and reproduced (see Lawson, 2015, Morgan 
2015a, Morgan 2015b). If authoritarian Morphogenic Societies are focused 
around responding to climate change, but not to transforming the causes of 
climate change, then they run the risk of continuing to overburden the planet. It 
is basic to ecological economics, politics and science that one cannot negotiate 
with the planet. One either does what is necessary to preserve and reproduce its 
capacities to preserve and reproduce ourselves, or one does not. Ecological limits 
do not respond to persuasion and have no way to value failed good intentions. 
Technology may help solve problems but technological determinism is itself a 
problem in a market system, which undermines our felt need to act with caution. 
Second, over time, the powerful may well comprehend that divisive 
authoritarian responses will be self-defeating and so may themselves become 
agents of transformation. This is in so far as they can break out of any lock-in 
into those positions. Third, it is conceivable, though unpalatable, that 
authoritarian responses may be functional. In the longer term the social form 
may itself be transformed, if authoritarian responses maintain civilisation in 
some places for a sufficient period to allow technological changes to address the 
problems of the political economy that the social form resisted directly 
addressing (short of an extinction event). Fourth, and most importantly, 
increasing recognition of the possibility of an authoritarian Morphogenic Society 
can itself constitute a resource for social movement responses, which recognize 
the extreme risk to the majority that the perpetuation of current power relations 
represent. That is, practical engagement as human flourishing for human 
flourishing is recognized as a contingent necessity.16  
Note, highlighting contingent necessity in the context above is not simply 
naïve -- in so far as it places the emphasis on transformative human action for 
human flourishing. The recognition does not require one to ignore the structural 
power of capital, the nature of power and interests. It does require one to ignore 
counsels of despair, and so perhaps be wilfully naïve and so knowingly naïve (to 
add another semantically awkward combination). Moreover, this is quite 
                                                        
16 For the general plausibility of the ways of thinking about the future set out in this paragraph 
see Patomäki, 2008 and 2010 
different as an orientation to the future than Rawls’ veil of ignorance. Rawls’ 
invites the reader to put aside any knowledge of one’s position within a society 
and then consider what kind of social mechanisms one would want to observe.17 
Rawl’s argument is that if I can be anyone then I will argue for a society that 
benefits everyone: justice is grounded in merit, and reductions in inter-
generational privilege. However, Rawls assumes an ‘anyone’ position becomes 
an ‘everyone’ imperative. This is suggestive but incomplete because we may 
accept different levels of risk and so different types of social solution to the 
possibility of inequity and harm. More fundamentally, it puts aside for the 
purposes of philosophy that we are all someone and remain so always. It may be 
useful to create an ideal situation of persons that could not exist to make a point. 
But one can make the point more powerfully based on the reality of persons as 
common and the reality of consequences from the activity of those persons 
within systems (the collective interests of ‘we’ does not require us to be 
anonymised and effectively erased).          
Morphogenesis is the potential for things to be otherwise in two ways. It 
is the grounds by which change is occurring and it is the grounds that can be 
reflexively worked upon to shape what could arise. The two are in many respects 
overlapping if one accepts that reflexivity is increasingly inscribed in modern 
life. Of course, a further distinction must still be maintained. The capacity for 
reflexivity may be basic to the human, but the degree and quality of reflexivity 
may be a product of a social form. There is a difference. To emphasise the latter 
can be to emphasise pessimistically (oppressive socialisation in pathological 
systems creates adverse reflexivity). Here, one needs to consider the difference 
that difference makes. One overly socialises the human as a subject if one denies 
the capacity for real agency of the human by reducing the person to the 
socialised subject, whose reflexivity has been constructed to, and can only result 
in, the reproduction of the social form.  
One may be required to exercise greater reflexivity within the 
contemporary world (Modernity, neoliberalism, capitalism etc), but equally that 
reflexivity can be the grounds by which that world is altered. As such, though the 
emergence of a new social form may not require a question framework that asks: 
what is desirable in that new social form, it does not preclude it and seems to 
create an obligation to pursue that question.18 This is not least because of the 
consequences of the disintegrations of the modern world. If one fails to pursue 
the question, then one is not contributing to the construction and contestation of 
norms as ways we should live. One becomes merely a passive amanuensis of the 
times, rather than an active agent within time in terms of the times. In this sense, 
the Morphogenic Society project may be more than research. It may be a 
resource. In terms of an issue like climate change, it may serve as a point of 
departure, such that ‘we can’ becomes ‘we should’ becomes ‘we must’. 
 
                                                        
17 The same issues arise though in different ways, in terms of Habermas’s early use of Ideal 
Speech situations and then subsequent theory of communicative action (1986), in which he 
differentiates the conditions of reaching understanding (communicative activity). 
18 It is a curious feature of modern social science that it seemed actually necessary to make this 
argument, as though a normative focus on the good were a special case requiring special 
pleading, rather than is simply the case or intrinsic to social science, for further argument see 
Porpora, 2015 
References 
 
Archer, M. 1995. Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Archer, M. 2012. The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press  
Archer, M. 2013. Social Morphogenesis Dordrecht: Springer 
Archer, M. editor 2015. Generative Mechanisms: Transforming the Social Order 
Dordrecht: Springer 
Archer, M. editor 2017. Morphogenesis and Human Flourishing Dordrecht: 
Springer 
Assister, A. and Noonan, J. 2007. ‘Human needs: A realist perspective’ Journal of 
Critical Realism 6(2): 173-198  
Barnes, J. editor 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle: Volume Two Princeton: 
Princeton University Press  
Bauman, Z. 2000. Liquid Modernity Cambridge: Polity 
Bhaskar, R. 1993. Dialectic The Pulse of Freedom London: Verso 
Blackledge, P and Knight, K editors 2008. Virtue and Politics: Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
Revolutionary Aristotelianism London: University of Notre Dame Press  
Bruff, I. 2014. ‘The rise of authoritarian neoliberalism’, Rethinking Marxism 
26(1): 113-129 
Buxton N. and Hayes B. eds. 2016 The Secure and the Dispossessed London: Pluto 
Donati, P. and Archer, M. 2015. The Relational Subject Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Fullbrook, E. and Morgan, J. editors. 2017. Trumponomics: Causes and 
Consequences London: WEA/College Books  
Habermas, J. 1986. The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume One Cambridge: 
Polity Press 
Joseph, J. 2014. ‘Review: The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity,’ Journal of 
Critical Realism 13(1): 98-102 
Joseph, J. 2016. ‘Review: Social Morphogenesis and Late Modernity’ Journal of 
Critical Realism 15(2): 206-211 
Lawson, T. 2015. Essays on The nature and State of Modern Economics London: 
Routledge 
Mackie, J. L., 1965. ‘Causes and Conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 
2(4) 245–265 
Martins, N., 2007. ‘Realism, universalism and capabilities’ Review of Social 
Economy 65(3): 253-278 
Morgan. J. 2009. Private Equity Finance: Rise and Repercussions Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan  
Morgan, J. 2015a. ‘Seeing the potential of realism in economics’ Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 45(2): 176-201  
Morgan, J. 2015b. ‘Is economics responding to critique? What do the UK 2015 
QAA benchmarks indicate?’ Review of Political Economy 27(4): 518-538    
Morgan, J. 2016a. ‘Paris COP21: Power that speaks the truth?’ Globalizations 
13(6): 943-951 
Morgan, J. 2016b. ‘Change and a changing world? Theorizing Morphogenic 
Society’ Journal of Critical Realism 15 (3): 277-295   
Morgan, J. 2016c. ‘Corporation tax as a problem of MNC organizational circuits: 
The case for unitary taxation’ British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 18(2): 463-481  
Morgan, J. 2017. ‘Brexit: Be careful what you wish for?’ Globalizations 14(1): 118-
126 
Morgan, J. and Sheehan, B. 2015. ‘Has reform of global finance been 
misconceived? Policy documents, and the Volcker Rule’ Globalizations 12 
(5): 695-709 
Patomäki, H. 2008. The Political Economy of Global Security London: Routledge 
Patomäki, H. 2010. ‘Exploring possible, likely and desirable global futures: 
Beyond the closed vs open systems dichotomy’ pp 147-166 in Jonathan 
Joseph and Colin Wight editors Scientific Realism and International 
Relations Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  
Porpora, D. 2015. Reconstructing Sociology: The Critical Realist Approach 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice Oxford: Oxford University Press, revised 
edition 
Sandbeck S. and Schneider E. 2014. ‘From the sovereign debt crisis to 
authoritarian statism: Contradictions of the European state project’, New 
Political Economy 19(6): 847-871   
Sayer, A. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach London: Routledge, 
second edition  
Sayer, A. 2000. Realism and Social Science London: Sage 
Sayer, A 2011. Why Things Matter to People Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Smith, C. 2015 To Flourish or Destruct Chicago: Chicago University Press 
Spash, C. 2016. ‘This changes nothing: The Paris agreement to ignore reality,’ 
Globalizations 13(6): 928-933 
Taylor, C. 1992. The Ethics of Authenticity Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press  
 
 
